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COMMENTS
THE NCAA AND THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: REFORM IS
ON THE HORIZON
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1905, sixty-two colleges and universities became the
charter members of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States.! In 1906, the organization took the name the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA").2 The NCAA
was established "to protect young people from the dangerous and
exploitive athletics practices of the time."' Today, the organiza-
tion regulates some 400,000 student-athletes and boasts around
1000 member institutions.' The NCAA, a voluntary organization,
is the "oldest, wealthiest, and most powerful of the national asso-
ciations, governing the largest, richest, and most popular sports
programs in higher education."' The organization established it-
1. History, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/con
nect/public/ncaaabout+the+ncaawho+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last visited May
1, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see ROGER I. ABRAMS, SPORTS JUSTICE: THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF SPORTS 67
(2010). See generally Ronald J. Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in
Intercollegiate Athletics, in L. & AMATEUR SPORTS 161, 162 (Ronald J. Waicukauski ed.,
1982) ("The NCAA was formed in 1906 to regulate and supervise college athletics
throughout the United States. It is a voluntary association dedicated to the objective, as
described in its first constitution, of maintaining athletic activities 'on an ethical plane in
keeping with the dignity and high purpose of education.' Almost all the major colleges and
universities in the United States are members. There are other national associations regu-
lating intercollegiate sports, including the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics
(NAIA), composed of approximately 500 small four-year colleges and universities, the Na-
tional Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA), with a membership of about 600 two-
year colleges in its men's division, and the Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for
Women (AIAW), controlling women's sports for almost 800 colleges and universities.").
4. Who We Are, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect
/publiclNCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are (last visited May 1, 2012).
5. Waicukauski, supra note 3, at 162.
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self on the principle of protecting the amateur student-athlete
and has prided itself on that notion ever since.! The NCAA is a
prominent organization and understandably so; each year, mil-
lions of Americans occupy sofas and bar stools to watch college
football and college basketball games. Society highly values these
"amateur" athletes,' and millions of young adults have participat-
ed as student-athletes at NCAA member institutions over the
years.
The term "student-athlete" was designed by the NCAA to pre-
serve the amateur ideal'-that the student-athlete competed in
athletics for his or her own benefit and to increase his or her own
physical and moral fortitude.' But the NCAA crafted the term to
provide an easy defense against workers' compensation claims.o
This term might in fact be a complete falsehood. Student-
athletes, ideally, should be attending class and earning decent
grades while enjoying the opportunity to play the sport they love.
In reality, these student-athletes are arguably far more athlete
than student." Although the NCAA rules mandate that student-
6. History, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 1.
7. This comment focuses primarily on Division I football and men's basketball stu-
dent-athletes because their talents generate the most revenue. See Joe Nocera, Let's Start
Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/
01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html?pagewanted+all.
8. See Richard G. Johnson, Submarining Due Process: How the NCAA Uses Its Resti-
tution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of Their Right of Access to the Courts ... Until Oli-
ver v. NCAA, 11 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 459, 600 (2010) ("The NCAA's exploitation of college
athletes for its own commercial gain is egregious when the NCAA justifies such exploita-
tion on the basis that the players are student athletes-a term made up by the NCAA that
has no legal meaning."); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/20/the-shame-of-college-sports/
8643/.
9. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsS'N, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, § 1.2, at 1
(2011) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (noting that the purpose of the NCAA is "[tlo initiate,
stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to pro-
mote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and athlet-
ics participation as a recreational pursuit").
10. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 83-84 (2006) (noting that
the NCAA was "[situnned" by the Colorado Supreme Court's finding in University ofDen-
ver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953), that Ernest Nemeth, a football player at the
University of Denver, was an employee, and responded by creating the term "student-
athlete" and subsequently requiring its exclusive use).
11. See id. at 135 ("On the contrary, most of them are inadequately prepared for aca-
demic inquiry and, once enrolled, face enormous obstacles to fully experiencing the intel-
lectual aspect of university life.").
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athletes may only be required to participate in athletic activities
for twenty hours per week, 12 student-athletes attend hours of
''voluntary" workouts and spend their time on other activities
that are not actually voluntary." The student-athlete spends
countless hours training, watching film, participating in work-
outs, and traveling to and from games.14 These "students" gener-
ate billions of dollars for the NCAA, the universities, and third
parties, such as athletic apparel and equipment companies and
television networks." The businessmen and businesswomen are
not concerned with the student-athletes' academic performance
but rather with their business model. Academic goals are easily
disregarded when the conversation turns to money and profits."6
Yet the student-athlete sees none of the money that exchanges
hands as a result of his or her performance. For instance, big col-
lege football teams, including the University of Texas, the Uni-
versity of Florida, the University of Michigan, and Pennsylvania
State University, bring in between "$40 million and $80 million
in profits a year, even after paying coaches multimillion-dollar
salaries."" The student-athlete is granted a scholarship that often
fails to cover the true cost of living, and thus he or she frequently
lives below the poverty line." The student-athlete is exploited.
12. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 17.1.6.1, at 238 ("A student-athlete's participation
in countable athletically related activities. . . shall be limited to a maximum of four hours
per day and 20 hours per week.").
13. See, e.g., Athletics Compliance Office, Countable Hours, U. NOTRE DAME, http://
ncaacompliance.nd.edulcountablehours.shtml (last visited May 1, 2012) (showing that
non-countable athletically related activities include meetings, study hall, training room
activities, travel to and from the competition, voluntary sport-related activities (initiated
by student-athlete), training banquets, fundraising, community service, or other public
relation activities including media activities).
14. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 10, at 99-101.
15. See id. at 76.
16. See id. at 136 ("In favoring commercial success over academic standards, colleges
and universities have minimized academic entrance requirements for athletes, weakened
academic standards, diluted curricula, assigned responsibilities to athletes that would con-
flict with any meaningful academic program, and stood by as wave after wave fails to
graduate or even to learn.").
17. Branch, supra note 8; Cork Gaines, Penn State's Football Program Brings in $50
Million Every Year, Bus. INSIDER, (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/penn-
states-football-program-worth-50-million-201 1-11 (noting that Penn State's football pro-
gram "produced $70.2 million in revenue and a profit of $50.4 million... [and] [o]nly the
University of Texas and the University of Georgia. . . made more money" from football
programs in 2009-2010.).
18. RAMOGI HuMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, NAT'L COLLEGE PLAYERS AsS'N, THE
PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORT (2011), http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/The-
Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf; McCormick & McCormick, supra note 10,
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Scandals have recently crowded the newspapers and sports
blogs with stories of one football player or another selling his own
jersey for a profit or accepting money from a booster.' These
scandals are unnerving because the NCAA's bylaws strictly pro-
hibit a student-athlete from profiting from his or her athletic per-
formance.2 But, as distinguished civil rights writer Taylor
Branch notes, the "real scandal is not that players are getting il-
legally paid or recruited"-it is that the NCAA's amateurism and
student-athlete principles are "legalistic confections propagated
by the universities so they can exploit the skills and fame of
young athletes."21 It is hard to imagine that the NCAA's founding
revolved around protecting student-athletes when those same
athletes do not receive a penny for their efforts and lack basic
rights under the NCAA's bylaws. In turn, the universities they
represent on the field receive millions of dollars in revenue based
on their athletic talents.2 2
This comment examines the NCAA's rules and regulations of
student-athletes and explores the possibility that the NCAA's ex-
istence, under its current bylaws and manual, is at least immoral
and likely unlawful. Additionally, this comment analyzes the idea
that the NCAA needs not only internal restructuring but judicial
and possibly congressional intervention in order to truly protect
young athletes' financial, academic, and basic human interests.
Part II of this comment explores the historical development of the
NCAA and the current relationship between the NCAA and the
student-athlete. Part III discusses the fundamental unfairness in
the NCAA's bylaws, which results in the denial of certain rights
to student-athletes. Part IV discusses whether student-athletes
should be compensated and how compensating student-athletes
might help create a fairer system. Part V examines how the
NCAA might reform through self-regulation, or more likely, be-
at 78-79 ("Indeed, many full-scholarship athletes live below the poverty line.").
19. See, e.g., Mike Wagner et al., Significant Inquiry by NCAA and OSU Under Way
for Pryor, Sources Say, COLUMBUs DISPATCH, May 30, 2011, available at http://www.dis
patch.com/content/stories/sports/2011/05/30/zzz.html (discussing the NCAA investigation
into Ohio State University student-athlete Terrelle Pryor allegedly selling memorabilia for
cars and tattoos).
20. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 12.1.2.1, at 63-65.
21. Branch, supra note 8.
22. See Steve Berkowitz & Jodi Upton, Money Flows to College Sports; Spending Up
Amid Schools' Right Times, USA TODAY, June 16, 2011, at 1A (noting that "[m]ore than
$470 million in new money poured into major college athletic programs" in 2010).
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cause of government or judicial intervention. Part VI concludes by
addressing possible future claims against the NCAA and the
means by which reform may come to fruition.
II. THE "STUDENT-ATHLETE"
A. The Birth of the NCAA and the Student-Athlete
The NCAA, under its current name, began in 1910 and grew to
become the country's main "regulatory and enforcement body for
intercollegiate athletics."" With amateurism as the goal, the or-
ganization put certain principles into the bylaws to protect the
student-athlete.24 As a former NCAA employee noted, the organi-
zation's "[flather was football and its mother was higher educa-
tion."" She observed that the merger between football and higher
education was an "almost unintentional union," and it was
"brought about in part by the proclivity of students to play
games."2 6
Even prior to the 1920s, the lines seemed blurred between the
amateur status of players and the role of students as athletes.2 7 In
1929, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
delivered to the NCAA a report titled American College Athlet-
ics.2 8 The study focused on two main issues: "commercialism and a
negligent attitude toward the educational opportunity for which a
college exists."" The study commented on the problems with the
athletic programs. It found that the programs themselves placed
"heavy burdens on the athletes"; furthermore, athletes faced "dis-
proportionate time requirements," and were "isolat[ed] from the
rest of the student body."" Moreover, the report noted that the
"highly compensated 'professional' coaches" focused primarily on
the sport instead of on the college education of their players." The
23. JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA's FIRST CENTURY 43, 55 (2006).
24. Id. at 55.
25. Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted.
27. See id. at 42-43 (noting that the union of sports and higher education was "beset
with cross-purposes and conflicting principles").
28. Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 65-66.
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lengthy report discussed "sportsmanship, eligibility, amateur-
ism ... and worsening professionalism, health questions, and the
'sorry role' of institutional alumni and excessive publicity."32
Overall, the research exposed "the record of excesses of intercolle-
giate athletics" while offering hopeful suggestions for a future
that would feature "a restoration of traditional amateur values
and practices."" Although these findings were made over eighty
years ago, the same conclusions might be drawn regarding the
state of the NCAA today.
As the NCAA has grown and evolved over the last century, the
findings in the Carnegie Foundation report remain incredibly
poignant. The current NCAA climate reveals that athletes, coach-
es, parents, and fans alike still grasp onto the hopeful ideal of
traditional amateur values, yet there is clear evidence that the
NCAA fails to protect student-athletes." The NCAA's bylaws are
the code that student-athletes and member universities must fol-
low if they want to be a part of the million-dollar industry. Yet
student-athletes are not really a part of the industry at all. Divi-
sion I men's basketball and men's football athletes provide the
entertainment, but they remain outsiders to the contracts, en-
dorsements, and financial gain. Although "big money" sports
comprise a small percentage of NCAA athletes, the NCAA derives
ninety percent of its revenue from this one percent of the college
athletes." The NCAA, universities, companies that provide
equipment and apparel to the universities, and television net-
works gain astronomically from the student-athlete and his or
her performance, but the student-athlete remains an outsider to
the system. The athlete is continuously exploited by the NCAA's
rules and regulations.
32. Id. The report also discussed that the "subsidized college athlete of today ... con-
nives at disreputable and shameful practices for the sake of material returns and for hon-
ors falsely achieved." Id. at 66. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 67.
34. See, e.g., Branch, supra note 8 (observing that "two of the noble principles on
which the NCAA justifies its existence-'amateurism' and the 'student-athlete'-are cyni-
cal hoaxes" in place to "exploit the skills and fame of young athletes").
35. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 1.3.2, at 1.
36. Branch, supra note 8.
[Vol. 46:11411146
NCAA AND THE STUDENT-ATHLETE
B. Today's NCAA and the "Student-Athlete"
In June 2010, the NCAA completed a four-year investigation of
Reggie Bush, formerly a star running back for the University of
Southern California'." The NCAA found that "Bush and his fami-
ly received hundreds of thousands of dollars in gifts" from two
sports agents.3 " Bush's actions violated the NCAA's rules, which
prohibit compensation of student-athletes and prohibit football
players from hiring a sports agent until the student declares for
the NFL draft." In September 2010, Reggie Bush forfeited the
Heisman Trophy, which is awarded to the most outstanding play-
er in college football.40 He did so in response to reports that the
Heisman Trophy Trust considered stripping him of the trophy be-
cause NCAA violations made him technically ineligible to play
during the 2005 season."
The NCAA also investigated Cam Newton, Auburn University's
star quarterback, regarding a pay-for-play allegations that his fa-
ther's attempted to sell Newton's services to a college for
$180,000.42 The NCAA concluded Newton did not violate the
NCAA's rules after completing an intensive thirteen-month inves-
tigation.43 Another scandal included twenty-eight Ohio State Uni-
versity ("OSU") football players.4 4 These student-athletes traded
autographs, jerseys, and other team memorabilia in exchange for
cash and tattoos.45 The incident also included former OSU Head
Coach Jim Tressel.46 Article 10.1 (d) of the NCAA bylaws provides
that unethical conduct by a prospective or enrolled athlete may
include, but is not limited to, "[k]nowingly furnishing or knowing-
ly influencing others to furnish the NCAA or the individual's in-
37. Mark Yost, Schools for Scandals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2010, at D5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bill Pennington, Bush, Ineligible for '05, Returns His Heisman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2010, at B15.
41. Chris Dufresne, Reggie Bush Gives Back the Heisman Trophy, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2010, at Cl.
42. Pete Thamel, Auburn Is Cleared in Investigation into Newton, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2011, at B17.
43. Id.
44. Teddy Greenstein, Cloud of Disgust; Buckeyes Coach Steps Down amid Ever-
widening Charges of Serious NCAA Violations, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 2011, at C1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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stitution false or misleading information concerning an individu-
al's involvement in or knowledge of matters relevant to a possible
violation of an NCAA regulation."47 This provision means that the
players must cooperate with NCAA investigators, even if state or
federal law does not require it. In the OSU case, Tressel was sus-
pended for failing to bring forward to OSU or the NCAA the mat-
ter of his players selling memorabilia."
These scandals demonstrate the corruption within the system.
The NCAA's compliance officers and investigations are a law unto
themselves. The system needs reform for a number of reasons, in-
cluding the functionality of its bylaws as well as how the student-
athletes are treated as an unpaid labor force. The NCAA's bylaws
are very specific rules enforcing a system where the student-
athlete is essentially powerless. Rules are rules, of course, and
the NCAA is at least called a "voluntary organization."49 But a
student-athlete competing week after week while generating
huge profits for the NCAA, television networks, and universities
must be treated with at least a certain amount of respect. After
all, it is the student-athlete who produces all of the excitement. A
football player who brings thousands of fans to the stadium and
even more to the television, equating to millions of dollars in tick-
et sales and contract deals, cannot earn a single dollar based on
his likeness, the sale of a replica jersey, or his autograph without
losing his student-athlete status and, consequently, his scholar-
ship.50
It would seem that these sports programs would be financial
powerhouses based on the pure volume of fans and media atten-
tion. Yet according to the NCAA, in 2010 just twenty-two schools
had athletic departments that turned a profit." For example, the
47. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 10.1(d), at 45.
48. Greenstein, supra note 44.
49. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 4.02.1, at 18.
50. See, e.g., Ben Cohen, The Case for Paying College Athletes-The Issue Is Gaining
Momentum, but Nobody Knows How to Do It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2011, at D10 (discuss-
ing that television income from athletic performances totals over $14 million while a stu-
dent-athlete at the University of Miami was suspended for a football game for accepting
benefits totaling $140). See generally NCAA Manual, supra note 9, § 12, at 61-62 (discuss-
ing that amateur status requires lack of compensation).
51. Libby Sander, 22 Elite College Sports Programs Turned a Profit in 2010, but Gaps
Remain, NCAA Reports Says, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 15, 2011, http://chronicle.
com/article/22-Elite-College-Sports/127921/; Berkowitz & Upton, supra note 22 ("The
NCAA, in an annual report on Division I finances released Wednesday, notes that the me-
dian net surplus for the 22 self-sufficient programs was about $7.4 million and the median
1148 [Vol. 46:1141
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University of Oregon athletic equipment generated $122,394,483
in total revenue while its total expenses amounted to
$77,856,232-providing a profit of $41,853,109.52 However, these
numbers may be unreliable. According to Walter Byers, the for-
mer Executive Director of the NCAA, "[t]he accounting variables
in college athletics make it difficult if not impossible to know
whether a big-time sport pays for itself, much less whether it
generates net receipts to finance deficit sports. Actual cost ac-
counting, in the sense of a hard-nosed business analysis, isn't
done."" It is worth noting that the history, English, biology, and
other educational departments at colleges and universities across
the country do not operate at a profit.54 Should athletic depart-
ments be expected to turn a profit? And even if they do generate a
profit, is there still something inherently wrong in allowing stu-
dent-athletes to receive some sort of payment based on their tal-
ents? It appears that the goal for big time football and men's bas-
ketball programs is profit, unlike, for instance, the goals of the
history department. The public involvement in college sports (un-
like college academics) makes men's basketball and football pro-
grams complex and seemingly far more important financially
than the academic programs. The NCAA itself made $845.9 mil-
lion in revenue in 2010-2011.55 The money surrounding college
athletics makes it evident that the student-athletes are in the
most unfortunate position of those involved. The way universities
treat the student-athletes in the current system is simply un-
workable despite the amateurism goals that the NCAA once rep-
resented. Student-athletes are forced to take part in an unfair
system perpetuated by the NCAA rules and regulations. The
NCAA's rules and regulations have become a self-protection
measure for the NCAA rather than carefully thought out rules to
protect the student-athlete.
net deficit for the other 98 major programs was about $11.3 million. The gap of nearly $19
million is up from $15.6 million in 2009.")
52. Berkowitz & Upton, supra note 22.
53. ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN
BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 149 (1999) (quoting Walter Byers) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Even the best and most regularly collected of the data we examined (the NCAA
Surveys) are fraught with problems of definition of elements, response bias, lack of
weighting, and misleading interpretations." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
54. Id. at 150.
55. Revenue, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/con
nect/public/ncaalfinances/revenue (last updated Jan. 17, 2012).
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Current data suggest that the financial aid permitted under
the NCAA rules sometimes runs short anywhere from $200 to
over $10,000 per athlete.5 ' There is a clear disjunction between
reality and the way that the NCAA currently operates. The
NCAA should consider a number of reforms in order to become an
organization focused on the protection of student-athletes instead
of the million-dollar contract.
The NCAA has received, and continues to receive, criticism
over the organization's treatment of players and the organiza-
tion's massive profits. The NCAA established itself as an organi-
zation committed to protecting college athletes from the dangers
and injuries attributed to playing sports at the collegiate level,
but more recently the NCAA has been condemned for how few
protections the student-athlete actually receives. "Oppressive
NCAA laws" are the main issue.
III. THE NCAA's BYLAWS
The 2011-2012 NCAA Division I Manual is 426 pages long.
The bylaws cover a wide range of student-athlete activities, but
there are certain provisions that specifically deny the student-
athlete general rights and treat the student-athlete as solely the
"entertainment product" rather than a protected participant in
college athletics."
A. The Restitution Rule
The NCAA's bylaw referred to as the "Restitution Rule" per-
tains to student-athletes who are ineligible under the NCAA rules
but allowed to participate in competition based on a court order
or injunction." Under the rule, if the injunction is vacated or re-
versed, the NCAA may take action against the student-athlete's
56. NCPA Scholarship Shortfall Search; NCAA Forces College Amenities to Pay,
NAT'L COLLEGE PLAYERS ASS'N, http://www.nepanow.org/research?id=0018 (last visited
May 1, 2012); see McCormick & McCormick, supra note 10, at 78-79 ("Indeed, many full-
scholarship athletes live below the poverty line."); Irvin Muchnick, Welcome to Plantation
Football, L.A. TIMES MAG., Aug. 31, 2003, at 114.
57. WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 365 (1995).
58. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, at 426.
59. See, e.g., id., § 12.3, at 70.
60. Id. § 19.7, at 326.
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college." This rule essentially undermines the judicial process by
allowing the NCAA to punish student-athletes and member insti-
tutions following a matter's final ruling.
As noted by law professors Matthew J. Mitten and Timothy
Davis, "The actual or threatened application of rules of restitu-
tion provides a strong disincentive for schools to allow student-
athletes to participate in athletic competition even when athletes
have prevailed in litigation against a sports governing body at the
trial court level."62 The rule allows the NCAA to intimidate
schools into following the NCAA's bylaws and constitution, in-
stead of a court order.63 The Restitution Rule effectively is "the
same as if the student-athlete had been required, as a condition
of participation in NCAA athletics, to sign a waiver of recourse to
judicial review of NCAA eligibility decisions."64 This practice re-
sults in keeping member schools from enforcing judicial court or-
ders and injunctions."
The rule was explored in the Ohio case, Oliver v. NCAA.'" Rich-
ard Johnson, the attorney for the student-athlete, followed his
participation in the case by writing an extensive law review arti-
cle on the topic.67 He suggests that the Restitution Rule, in its
current form, is void as against public policy because the rule
"seeks to influence the issuance of an injunction, and then it
seeks to overrule the court's appellate bond with one of its own
making."" This argument is compelling and indicative of the
NCAA's true power to control university action.
61. Id. (noting that "if a student-athlete who is ineligible under the terms of the
[NCAA] constitution, bylaws or other legislation of the Association is permitted to partici-
pate in intercollegiate competition contrary to such NCAA legislation but in accordance
with the terms of a court restraining order or injunction operative against the institution
attended by such student-athlete or against the Association, or both, and said injunction is
voluntarily vacated, stayed or reversed or it is finally determined by the courts that in-
junctive relief is not or was not justified, the Board of Directors may take" a number of ac-
tions against the university or college the student-athlete attends).
62. Johnson, supra note 8, at 568 (quoting Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Ath-
lete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 146 n.362 (2008)).
63. Stephen F. Ross & S. Baker Kensinger, Judicial Review of NCAA Decisions: Eval-
uation of the Restitution Rule and a Call for Arbitration 7-8 (May 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/stephenross/1.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Johnson, supra note 8, at 501.
66. 920 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ohio Com Pl. 2009).
67. Johnson, supra note 8, at 462-64.
68. Id. at 571.
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In Oliver v. NCAA, Andrew Oliver, a college baseball player,
was indefinitely suspended from playing baseball because he was
accused, by his former attorneys, of having lawyers present dur-
ing a meeting with a professional baseball team." NCAA Bylaw
12.3.2.1 prohibits this activity," and the NCAA generally prohib-
its student-athletes from hiring an agent." Oliver took his case to
the Ohio courts and won. 2 An Ohio judge invalidated the NCAA's
bylaws that according to Richard Johnson "deprive college ath-
letes of the right to counsel to indirectly regulate attorneys, and
to manipulate the judicial system."" The court held that the by-
law "prohibiting attorney representing a student athlete from be-
ing present during contract negotiations between athlete and pro-
fessional sports organization violated the contractual obligation of
good faith and fair dealing."74 Johnson also notes that to his
knowledge the NCAA "has never found any college athlete to be
improperly suspended."" The ruling could have had nationwide
implications in granting student-athletes rights. But before Oli-
ver's next suit regarding contract rights was to be heard, the
NCAA and Oliver settled the case for $750,000.6 The settlement
required Judge Tone, who had invalidated the NCAA bylaws ear-
lier, to vacate his order."
Despite Oliver's success in court, the NCAA continues to main-
tain the status quo through deep pockets and fearful member in-
stitutions.,This case is illustrative of the need for a court to man-
date the bylaws be changed to provide student-athletes adequate
rights. At least one judge has found the student-athlete's claim
viable, so one could conclude that judicial review may be an ave-
nue for student-athletes to access rights they deserve. The Resti-
tution Rule was adopted based on the NCAA's intent "[t]o elimi-
nate references to disciplinary or corrective actions against
69. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 207; see T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a
Contractual Curveball at the NCAA's "Veil of Amateurism," 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 177
(2010).
70. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 12.3.2.1, at 70).
71. NCAA MANuAL, supra note 9, § 12.3.1, at 70.
72. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 218-19.
73. Id. at 212, 215; Johnson, supra note 8, at 461 editor's note.
74. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 215.
75. Johnson, supra note 8, at 468.
76. Lockhart, supra note 69, at 178.
77. Id.
78. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 219.
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student-athletes."" But it is clear from Oliver v. NCAA that the
rule itself denies student-athletes basic due process rights."o The
NCAA continues to be unwilling to adopt measures to protect the
student and, in this case, even denies a student the right to move
forward after a court order.
B. Scholarship Options and Protecting the Student-Athlete
The 2011-2012 NCAA Manual allows NCAA member institu-
tions to offer one-year renewable scholarships." Recently, the
measure changed and now universities may offer a multi-year
scholarship, although they are not required to do so.82 The former
one-year scholarship rule is an example of how the NCAA empha-
sized the athlete rather than the student. The one-year scholar-
ship, with the option of renewal, benefits the coaches, and even
the more current option of providing a multi-year scholarship still
does not require coaches to renew offers. If a new coach is brought
in because the former coach failed to win enough games, the new
coach may decide not to renew a number of scholarships, enabling
him to bring in his own players and recruits. Accordingly, univer-
sities are far less concerned with the student-athlete's graduation
and are more concerned with championships and the revenues
they generate. The American Council on Education has suggested
making all the athletic scholarships need-based, which would
leave the decision-making process to the financial aid offices, ra-
ther than to the coaches' playbooks." Under a need-based model,
no athlete would be at the whim of a coach to provide a one-year
or multi-year scholarship.
79. Johnson, supra note 8, at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the
Restitution Rule is a means by which the NCAA prohibits traditional due process rights to
student-athletes).
80. The NCAA does not have to provide due process rights to its student-athletes.
BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS
COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 143 (2012). In NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not a state
actor and therefore the NCAA was not required to provide due process. Id. at 191, 195-96.
This resulted in colleges "still danc[ing] to the NCAA's tune, and their students and em-
ployees continu[ing] to be denied sufficient legal protections in the enforcement process."
Id. at 143.
81. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 15.3.1, at 200, § 15.3.3, at 201.
82. Steve Yanda, NCAA Wrestles With Implications of Stipends for Student-Athletes,
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2012, at D06.
83. MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS 34 (2000).
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Student-athlete Joseph Agnew attempted to change the one-
year scholarship rule through a suit against the NCAA." He at-
tended Rice University in Texas after accepting an athletic schol-
arship to play football.15 The scholarship was equal to the annual
cost of attending Rice." Unfortunately, Agnew was injured during
his second year at Rice and was informed that his scholarship
would not be renewed for his junior year." Agnew "appealed the
non-renewal of his scholarship and ultimately 'receiv[ed] a full
year's tuition despite no longer being a member of the Rice foot-
ball team.""' However, Agnew had to pay his own tuition and ex-
penses for his senior year."
Agnew, along with his co-plaintiff Patrick Courtney, subse-
quently filed suit arguing that the NCAA bylaws created a "price-
fixing agreement and restraint between member institutions of
the NCAA."" They challenged two of the NCAA bylaws as unlaw-
ful." Agnew and Courtney challenged bylaw 15.3.3.1, which in-
cludes the one-year scholarship limit that prohibits NCAA mem-
ber institutions from offering multi-year athletic based scholar-
ships to student-athletes." They also challenged the NCAA's by-
laws which cap the number of athletic based scholarships a school
can offer per sport per year."
Ultimately, the court denied Agnew's request to strike down
the NCAA's rule prohibiting colleges and universities from offer-
ing any scholarship longer than a one-year commitment-to be
renewed, or not, unilaterally by the school." This rule in practice
means that coaches, who are often concerned only with winning,
get to determine which players continue to receive scholarships.
84. Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 WL
3878200, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 15.3.3.1, at 200).
93. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 15.5.4, at 207).
94. Id. at *10.
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Essentially, the court sided with the NCAA and found that (1)
the plaintiffs failed to plead that there was a relevant market and
(2) that the facts were insufficient to show that the NCAA's ac-
tions had in fact injured competition as a whole in the relevant
market." But despite the court's finding, it appears the one-year
scholarship rule may in fact be an unlawful restraint on the mar-
ket of college athletes. The thousands of NCAA member schools
who participate in recruiting college athletes to play at their par-
ticular programs make up this market. A few states have at-
tempted to implement reform to provide multi-year scholar-
ships." However, such measures then risk the possibility that the
NCAA will exclude their athletic programs from competition,
which means a loss in revenue."
The NCAA now provides member institutions with the option
of offering multi-year scholarships." In October 2011, the NCAA
Division I board of directors approved the multi-year scholarship
option which gave NCAA member institutions the option of offer-
ing multi-year scholarships to athletes." This measure did not
come from pressure from university presidents, court cases, or
other influential sources-the NCAA proposed this rule itself."oo
The member schools attempted to repeal this option in February
2012, but failed to do so."o' The option's opponents were just two
votes short to repeal, which is indicative of the member institu-
tion's sentiments regarding multi-year scholarships. 02  They
hoped to repeal the NCAA's measure under the belief that
"coaches were using multi-year grants as a recruiting entice-
ment."o The measure should provide more stability to student
athletes; however, because students are still unable to secure an
agent to help negotiate and guarantee a scholarship, the option in
practice may be less effective than Agnew once argued. The op-
95. Id. at *8, *9 n.9.
96. HUMA & STAUROWSKY, supra note 18, at 25.
97. Id. "The NCAA threatened pro-reform states such as California and Nebraska of
the loss of NCAA membership and revenue that would accompany the implementation of
these types of changes." Id. (citations omitted).
98. Steve Wieberg, Multiyear Scholarship Rule Narrowly Survives Override Vote, USA
TODAY (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-02-17/multiyear
-scholarships-survives-close-vote/53137194/1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
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tion is the first step, but the NCAA should also provide the ability
for students to secure an agent to help negotiate the terms of the
scholarship as a contract in order to ensure fairness throughout
the process.
This multi-year scholarship will be a significant change from
the NCAA's former practices and will hopefully create an envi-
ronment more protective of student-athletes' academic pursuits.
Yet scholarship is still an area where the NCAA seems to fail in
its mission to protect student-athletes. Some argue that an ath-
letic scholarship is sufficient compensation for an athlete's per-
formance. A college education certainly is valuable and will pay
exponentially upon graduation. But is an athletic scholarship tru-
ly compensation? And even if it is, does that validate the scholar-
ship, transfer, and other restrictions that the NCAA imposes?
The IRS has found that "in the absence of an explicit require-
ment of athletic performance, an athletic scholarship is not re-
garded as compensation for tax purposes."'0 4 This finding has
been "criticized as 'rather naive,' since athletic awards 'are made
to secure the athlete's services and generally are maintained sub-
ject to his participation in college athletics.""o Although one-year
scholarships may now be a thing of the past, if universities are
not required to guarantee multi-year scholarships, is this another
indication that scholarships are not in fact just "compensation"
for an athlete's performance? Additionally, if a student-athlete is
unable to negotiate with the assistance of counsel or an agent for
a beneficial scholarship guarantee, the rule may be ineffective in
truly protecting the student-athlete's academic or athletic pur-
suits.
C. Transfer Restrictions
The NCAA's bylaws also include lengthy and confusing trans-
fer restrictions. They allow a university or college to restrict any
player from transferring to another NCAA program.106 The trans-
fer restriction is outlined in NCAA bylaw 14.5: "Transfer Regula-
104. Waicukauski, supra note 3, at 174 (citing Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47).
105. Id. (quoting Richard L. Koplan, Intercollegiate Authorities and the Unrelated
Business Income Tape, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1462 (1980)).
106. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.5, at 1873-82; see, e.g., Jeff Barker, Asking
'Fresh Start,' Terps QB O'Brien Gets Release, BALT. SUN., Feb. 14, 2012, at Dl.
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tions."" Under bylaw 14.5.1, a student-athlete who transfers to a
member institution from any college institution must "complete
one full academic year of residence . . . at the certifying institu-
tion before being eligible to compete for . . . the member institu-
tion" unless the student meets the transfer exception require-
ments."o' The bylaws allow student-athletes to be eligible for four
years, but they must compete within a five-year window."o' The
bylaws do provide a complete exception for a one-time transfer
without penalty; however, this exception is available only to stu-
dents who do not participate in "baseball, basketball, bowl subdi-
vision football or men's ice hockey."110 The only other exceptions
apply narrowly to a few specific student groups, including the ex-
change student exception,'" the discontinued academic program
exception,"2 the military service exception,"' and the internation-
al student program exception."4
The NCAA transfer restrictions have caused players and
coaches alike to get lost in the NCAA regulations. Todd O'Brien, a
former basketball player at St. Joseph's University ("St. Joe's"),
wrote an article for Sports Illustrated describing his experience
with the transfer restrictions under the NCAA's rules."' O'Brien
is an intelligent and athletic twenty-two-year-old who graduated
107. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.5, at 173-82.
108. Id. § 14.5.1, at 173; cf. Sarah M. Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA
Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1586 (2003) ("Practically, then, a student-athlete
wishing to use his maximum four years of athletic eligibility can transfer colleges only
once.").
109. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.2, at 152, § 14.2.1, at 152 ("A student-athlete
shall complete his or her seasons of participation within five calendar years from the be-
ginning of the semester or quarter in which the student-athlete first registered for a min-
imum full-time program .. ").
110. Id. § 14.5.5.2.10(A), at 179.
111. Id. § 14.5.5.2.2, at 178 ("The student is enrolled in the certifying institution for a
specified period of time as a bona fide exchange student participating in a formal educa-
tional exchange program that is an established requirement of the student-athlete's cur-
riculum.").
112. Id. § 14.5.5.2.3, at 178 ("The student changed institutions in order to continue a
major course of study because the original institution discontinued the academic program
in the student's major.").
113. Id. § 14.5.2.2.5, at 178 ("The student returns from at least 12 months of active ser-
vice in the armed forces of the United States.").
114. Id. § 14.5.5.2.4, at 178. ("The individual is an international student who is re-
quired to transfer (one or more times) because of a study program predetermined by the
government of the student's nation or the sponsoring educational organization.").
115. Todd O'Brien, St. Joe's Won't Release Me to Play at UAB and I Don't Know Why,
SI.coM (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011fbasketball/ncaa/12/
19/todd.obrien/index.html.
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from St. Joe's after transferring from Bucknell University. 116 He
chose to pursue a graduate degree at the University of Alabama
at Birmingham ("UAB") in order to further his education. "
O'Brien is also eligible to participate in the basketball program as
a graduate student-he hoped to do so, but under the NCAA's
rules, St. Joe's reserves the right to refuse to release him."" With-
out St. Joe's permission-which they did not grant-O'Brien may
not compete at UAB."' Upon review the NCAA upheld St. Joe's
denial of the transfer waiver despite the lack of evidence showing
that O'Brien is pursuing a graduate degree at UAB simply to play
basketball.120
The twenty-two year old is now practicing with, training with,
and is essentially part of the UAB basketball team-yet he can-
not actually play because his former coach will not allow him to
do so.121 The rule seems completely arbitrary in this case. If the
coaches can decide not to renew a player's scholarship or to offer
multi-year or one-year scholarships,'2 2 it seems that a player
should, within reason, be able to transfer to another school or
pursue a graduate degree and be allowed to play.
D. Likeness and Licensing Rights
Article 16 of the NCAA's bylaws discusses rules regarding ben-
efits and expenses for enrolled student-athletes. 2 ' Under the pro-
vision, a student-athlete is not entitled to receive "any extra bene-
fit."124 Under Article 12, titled "Amateurism," the bylaws set out
12 5general principles regarding a student-athlete's amateur status.
Under bylaw 12.5.2, a student-athlete is not permitted to use his
or her name or picture to promote a business. 2 6 As such, a stu-
dent-athlete may not profit or receive royalties from his or her
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.5.5.2.10(d), at 179.
119. O'Brien, supra note 115.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Ray Glier, N.C.A.A. Offers Answers to States Challenging Its Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at D4.
123. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 16, at 217-34.
124. Id. § 16.01.1, at 217.
125. See id. § 12, at 61-77.
126. Id. § 12.5.2., at 75.
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NCAA likeness as a student-athlete, even after graduation. 127 Ad-
ditionally, the NCAA further requires that "[i]f a student-
athlete's name or picture appears on commercial items . . . or is
used to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or
agency without the student-athlete's knowledge or permission,
the student-athlete . . . is required to take steps to stop such ac-
tivity."128 The NCAA requires players to sign Form 08-3a, which
in effect requires each student-athlete "to relinquish all rights in
perpetuity to the commercial use of their images, including after
they graduate and are no longer subject to NCAA regulations."'2 9
These rules place significant burdens on student-athletes and
keep them from profiting, even after their college careers are
over."'o One former college star, Ed O'Bannon, has waged a battle
against the NCAA for this very reason."'
O'Bannon is a former University of California at Los Angeles
("UCLA") basketball star, who went on to play in the NBA for
several years.'32 O'Bannon helped UCLA win the 1995 national
title; today he is a car salesman in Nevada.' 2 O'Bannon filed suit,
individually, against the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing
Company (the "CLC") in July 2009 claiming that the NCAA un-
lawfully uses student-athletes' likenesses and images by refusing
to compensate the individuals even after the students have grad-
uated from college.'34 The NCAA forces student-athletes to sign
away their right to their likeness, and according to O'Bannon, the
NCAA and the CLC conspire to prevent former collegiate student-
athletes from receiving compensation for the use of their imag-
es.'3 O'Bannon claims that such practices unlawfully constrain
trade in violation of the Sherman Act, a core source of antitrust
law.' 6 Several athletes joined the suit against the NCAA and the
127. See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, C 09-3329
CW, C 09-4882 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
128. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 12.5.2.2, at 75.
129. O'Bannon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *3 (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
130. Id. at *3-5.
131. Id. at *2-5.
132. See Paul Gutierrez, UCLA Hero Ed O'Bannon Is Right at Home in Las Vegas Sell-
ing Cars, SI.COM (Mar. 18, 2009, 2:09 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/
the bonus/03/18/obannonlindex.html.
133. Id.
134. O'Bannon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *2-3.
135. Id. at *4-5.
136. Id. at *5.
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case was consolidated and renamed In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation."'
The first claim in the suit focuses on whether the NCAA vio-
lates the Sherman Act by requiring student-athletes to forgo their
identity rights in perpetuity."' If student-athletes were not re-
quired by the NCAA to forgo their rights, the athletes would have
the opportunity to negotiate their own licensing deals.139 The
plaintiffs' second claim revolves around the "right of publicity."140
The right of publicity involves a person's right to one's property,
including the person's name or likeness and even one's image,
voice, or signature. 4 ' Under the action, the plaintiffs claim that
the NCAA "sanctions, facilitates and profits from EA's use of stu-
dent-athletes' names, pictures and likenesses."'42 The complaint
asserts that in exchange for profits from video games, the NCAA
"granted the software company [EA] the right to reproduce the
stadiums, uniforms, and mascots of schools that are members of
the NCAA."'4 3 The current rules allow video game purchasers to
download rosters of the players, although the players' names are
absent from the jerseys on the video game.'44 Further, the plain-
tiffs assert that the EA and NCAA conspired by agreeing to "boy-
cott and refuse to deal with [a]ntitrust [p]laintiffs . . . regarding
compensation for the use and sale of their images, likenesses,
and/or names."14 '
137. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-011967
CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82682, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2011). Eleven additional ath-
letes have since joined the case as plaintiffs. Shaun Assael, Five Lawsuits that Will
Change Sports, ESPN (Nov. 8, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://espn.go.com/iespnlotl/blog//name/
assael shaunlid/5780468.
138. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82682, at *7.
139. To state a claim under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must plead facts that point to
a contract or conspiracy between two or more parties that "was intended to impose an un-
reasonable restraint of trade." Id. at *12 (citing Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d
1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)).
140. Id. at *7.
141. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 958 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Come-
dy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001)).
142. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 52, In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46841 (N.D.
Cal. 2011).
143. Id. at 112.
144. Id. at 113.
145. Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 142, In re NCAA Stu-
dent-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46841 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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Despite the lawsuit and the meritorious claims, there is a coun-
terargument: the NCAA's bylaws require amateurism in order to
enforce and maintain the "boundary between college and profes-
sional sports."146 Additionally, the student-athlete's scholarship is
a contract based on the student's promise to participate in college
athletics and the college's promise to provide assistance to finance
the student's education."' The NCAA's bylaw prohibiting a stu-
dent-athlete from profiting seems to embody the amateur ideal
and superficially would keep college sports "educational" rather
than "profitable." However, the system has become a big business
for the NCAA, member colleges, and other corporations and busi-
nesses, including television networks, broadcasters, and video
game companies. This big business atmosphere, like the current
NCAA structure, exploits the student-athlete rather than protect-
ing the amateurism ideal for which the NCAA once stood.
The O'Bannon case is set for trial in May 2013."' Michael
Hausfeld, counsel for the plaintiffs, believes that athletes have
certain rights and that the plaintiffs will win the battle. 9 If the
plaintiffs win this case, the NCAA may be required to restructure
the way that it operates and, in turn, would be required to com-
pensate players in one form or another.' The NCAA has reason
to be fearful and hope the case settles because damages in a case
like this could be colossal.
This lawsuit may open the doors for compensation of student-
athletes. Allowing student-athletes to profit from their images,
even if only after they graduate from college, would provide one
way for students to gain access to the market. The NCAA's by-
laws maintain a complete bar on the compensation of student-
athletes, arguably, other than the scholarships student-athletes
are offered. The bylaws act above the law and consistently deny
student-athletes the ability to live with financial, academic, and
athletic stability.
146. Mary Catherine Moore, There Is No "I" in NCAA Why College Sports Video Games
Do Not Violate College Athletes' Rights of Publicity Such to Entitle Them to Compensation
for Use of Their Likenesses, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 278 (2010).
147. Id. at 279.
148. Nocera, supra note 7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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IV. COMPENSATION
From the mega stars like Cam Newton to the red-shirted
freshmen, the NCAA men's basketball and football players are
the "Entertainment Product.""' These students are invaluable to
their colleges and universities. The NCAA fails to provide ath-
letes with the right to their likenesses and fails to provide an
agent or attorney at pivotal times. The NCAA also fails to provide
adequate financial support to student-athletes, despite athletic
scholarships that pay for full tuition and board. Scholarships may
only cover certain costs, and the NCAA does not require member
colleges to provide for the true cost of living.152 The NCAA is also
guilty of depriving students of simple workers' compensation. A
student-athlete should be treated just like the student who works
in the library. If a student who works behind the library's circula-
tion desk is injured on the job, he or she will receive workers'
compensation under most states' workers' compensation laws."'
On the other hand, a football player, basketball player, or any
other student-athlete may be sent home after a concussion, ACL
tear, or any other serious injury.54
The NCAA's bylaws provide that a NCAA member school may
provide medical insurance, but it is not required to do so."'5 Arti-
cle 16.4 provides that an institution may finance certain permis-
sible medical expenses including medical insurance, life insur-
ance, drug-rehabilitation expenses, counseling for eating
disorders, glasses, medical examinations, and expenses for medi-
cal treatment."' But the language of the Article clearly does not
require member schools to provide such benefits, and because
student athletes are not considered employees, they may not re-
151. MARK YOST, VARSITY GREEN 13-14, 18 (2010). "My job is to protect The Enter-
tainment Product .... My job is to make sure that The Entertainment Product studies.
My job is to make sure that The Entertainment Product makes adequate academic pro-
gress according to NCAA guidelines." Id. (quoting Phil Hughes, athletic director for stu-
dent services at Kansas State University).
152. Patrick Hruby, Stop the Madness: The Free Market Case Against the NCAA's
Chokehold on College Sports, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at C1O.
153. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-02 (2006) (federal worker's compensation); see, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 65.2-101 (2007 & Supp. 2011) (defining "employee" under Virginia worker's com-
pensation law).
154. See, e.g., Agnew v. Nat'1 College Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:11 cv0293 JMS MJD, 2011
3878200 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
155. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 16.4.1, at 221.
156. Id. § 16.4, at 221.
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ceive any benefits under state workers' compensation laws or
university employee benefit policies.
A. Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Association
Texas Christian University ("TCU") is a small college in Fort
Worth, Texas.'" In 1974, Kent Waldrep was a star running back
at TCU." By October 1974, Waldrep was no longer a college ath-
lete; instead, he was a former college athlete, paralyzed after a
collision with another player."' During a regular season game
against the University of Alabama, Waldrep's neck snapped after
a violent collision.6 o TCU paid for his medical bills for nine
months, but then they stopped providing support."' Doctors told
him that he would never have feeling from the neck down.'62
Waldrep chose to file a worker's compensation claim in order to
receive benefits because of the injury he sustained "on the job" as
a student-athlete.' In 1993, the Texas Workers' Compensation
Commission "found that [Waldrep] was indeed an employee and
awarded him $70 a week for life and medical expenses dating to
the accident.""' TCU's insurance carrier appealed the decision.
The case, Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Association,
went to the Texas Court of Appeals where the court struck down
Waldrep's worker's compensation claim.'65 The court determined
that under Texas law the letter of intent and the college scholar-
ship did not make Waldrep a college employee.' Waldrep's attor-
ney argued that "[TCU] had a written contract with Waldrep,
that the university paid him, and that the university had the
right of control."' Waldrep's case was decided in 2000, but there
157. At a Glance, TEXAS CHRISTIAN U., http://www.tcu.edulat-a-glance.asp (last visited
May 1, 2012).
158. Joe Drape, College Football: A Question of Responsibility; Injured Player's Case
Could Shake up N.C.A.A, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at C1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Editorial, College Sports: Hardly Amateur, CHARLESTON GAZETE, Nov. 25, 2011,
at P4A.
162. Drape, supra note 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 21 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. App. 2000).
166. Id. at 701.
167. Drape, supra note 158.
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is still the possibility that a court could find that student-athletes
are in fact employees.
It is hard to believe that a student-athlete is not an employee
when one considers that CBS and Turner Broadcasting paid $771
million to the NCAA for the television rights to the 2011 Men's
NCAA Basketball Tournament. 6 Certainly money exchanged for
television contracts, ticket sales, and other financial gains from
college athletics pay for scholarships, training facilities, and mul-
ti-million dollar stadium construction. If those against "pay-for-
play" measures argue that the student's scholarship is in fact
"payment," that would, using common sense, make the student-
athlete an employee.'69 There is no denying that the student-
athlete gains a great deal from simply being a part of the team
and by receiving an athletic scholarship; however, the student-
athlete needs greater protection under the NCAA's bylaws.
B. Should We Pay Them?
Workers' compensation naturally brings up questions of "pay-
for-play." Should a college-athlete be paid for his work on the
field? How could this measure ever be feasible? It seems against
traditional notions of "amateurism" and even seems inherently
wrong for a college athlete to be paid for his or her performance
on the field. Isn't the athlete just a college student who suits up to
play a sport for the good of his body and soul? In reality, the play-
er is not just playing for his own personal growth and benefit; the
result of his performance-for third parties- is dollars and cents.
As inherently wrong as it seems to pay the athlete, it is equally
unjust for the universities, Nike, ESPN, and the NCAA to profit
while the athlete is left unprotected and uncompensated. As
prominent writer and economist Andrew Zimbalist notes, "[b]ig-
time intercollegiate athletics is a unique industry. No other in-
dustry in the United States manages not to pay its principal pro-
168. Branch, supra note 8.
169. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 10, at 79 ("[G]rant-in-aid athletes in reve-
nue-generating sports at Division I NCAA schools are 'employee-athletes,' not merely 'stu-
dent-athletes.' Under the foundational pillar of U.S. labor policy-the National Labor Re-
lations Act . . .- the relationship between scholarship athletes and their colleges and
universities can no longer be fairly characterized as anything other than an employment
relationship in which the athletes serve as employees and the institutions for which they
labor as their employers.") (footnote omitted).
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ducers a wage or salary.""o He further reasons that, "[t]o grasp its
modus operandi, it is necessary to consider each of its component
parts: its unpaid athletes . . . , its athletic directors and coach-
es . . . , its relations to the media . . . , to the government, to the
athletic shoe companies and other businesses . . . , and, finally, its
relation to the NCAA cartel."7 '
This NCAA "cartel" brings in billions of dollars, and the num-
bers do not lie.7 2 The Southeastern Conference brought in reve-
nues of over $1 billion last year, and the Big 10 Conference made
over $900 million." A student-athlete is mostly disposable-a
new coach may create a new line-up or even decide not to renew a
player's scholarship. The conference will still make hundreds of
millions of dollars, regardless of which player is scoring three-
pointers or touchdowns. Furthermore, the cable networks and
athletic apparel companies are not the only actors bringing in
millions.174 Top-tier football programs pay their coaches huge sal-
aries. Urban Meyer, the head coach for OSU, has an employment
contract that includes $4 million in annual compensation."' The
contract includes a golf membership, bonuses for certain achieve-
ments, and a $1200 monthly automobile stipend for the costs of
two automobiles.'7 6
College football coaches are not alone in their pursuit of mil-
lion-dollar coaching contracts. Some big time basketball coaches
now have annual contracts exceeding $4 million.'7 7 Although stu-
dent-athletes are also meant to be attending classes, professors'
average salaries have increased by 32% since 1984, while head
170. Zimbalist, supra note 5, at 6 ("Rather than having many competing firms, big-time
college sports is organized as a cartel, like OPEC, through the NCAA.").
171. Id.
172. The NCAA alone brought in $845 million in revenues in 2010-2011. Revenue,
NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaal
finances/revenue (last visited May 1, 2012).
173. Charles P. Pierce, The Beginning of the End for the NCAA, GRANTLAND, (Nov. 1,
2011, 10:38 AM), http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/7177921/the-beginning-end-ncaa;
see also Branch, supra note 8 ("That money comes from a combination of ticket sales, con-
cession sales, merchandise, licensing fees, and other sources-but the great bulk of it
comes from television contracts.").
174. See, e.g., Yost, supra note 151, at 74 tbl. 4.1 (showing recent all-school endorse-
ment deals, including a $6 million five-year contract between Florida State University and
Nike and a $5.7 million six-year contract between Nike and the University of Michigan).
175. Document: Urban Meyer's Ohio State Contract, CBS SPORTS BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011,
3:16 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/24156338/33581501.
176. Id.
177. Branch, supra note 8.
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football coaches' salaries have increased by 750%.17' The disjoint
is astonishing. Moreover, the NCAA did attempt to cap assistant
coaches' salaries, but nearly 2000 of the coaches filed an antitrust
lawsuit and settled for more than $50 million.'7 ' Today, the top
assistant coaches' salaries are over $500,000 and in 2009 at least
one assistant coach's salary topped $1 million."'o Urban Meyer's
$4 million contract is an absurd amount of money compared to
the $87,700 average associate professor salary at OSU.' ' Academ-
ic institutions exist for the pursuit of academics rather than the
pursuit of championships-yet some of the highest paid (and one
would argue highest valued) individuals on campus are the men's
basketball or football coaches.
Multiple sports writers have suggested, in one form or another,
a new system where the NCAA pays players for their perfor-
mance.18 Possible sources are endorsement deals from various
companies or a flat-out paycheck from the member institution.
One coach has even suggested that coaches should pay the play-
ers out of their own pockets on game day."' The cases described
above demonstrate that student-athletes need contractual rights
that they are not afforded under the NCAA's current bylaws. A
contractual right should not be disregarded simply because a per-
son is a student-athlete. Moreover, the student-athlete has rights
that, despite notions of amateurism, should be upheld.
1. Olympic Model
Olympic athletes were once like student-athletes-they were
forbidden from profiting from their success in the Olympic
Games.184 Now, Olympic athletes are featured in television, print,
and other advertisements."' Student-athletes could operate simi-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. AAUP Faculty Salary Survey, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., http://chronicle.com/stats/
aaup/index.php?action=detail&id=2874 (last visited May 1, 2012).
182. See, e.g., Tracee Hamilton, In College Football, Everyone Cashes in but the Players,
WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2010, at DO; Michael Wilbon, As Colleges' Greed Grows, So Does the
Hypocrisy, WASH. PosT, Sept. 10, 2010, at D05.
183. David Jones, Spurrier Wants to Pay Players, FLA. TODAY, June 2, 2011, at C5 (de-
scribing South Carolina coach Steve Spurrier's proposal that coaches pay players $300 per
game).
184. See Alexander Theroux, The Olympic Sham, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1999, at A22.
185. See, e.g., Michael E. Ruane, Olympics Still Months Away, Swimmer Brings Home
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larly. The NCAA would not be required to offer any money to the
individual athletes,1 6 instead the student-athlete could contract
with businesses, advertisers, apparel companies, and others to
profit from his or her success. The NCAA would then only need to
alter the bylaws to allow the NCAA student-athlete to profit from
his or her image and would need to allow a student to hire an
agent and an attorney to negotiate acceptable contracts.
The National College Players Association (the "NCPA") rec-
ommends adopting the Olympic model for paying student-
athletes.' The model would allow players to accept payments for
autograph signing and endorsement deals and to generally partic-
ipate in the free market.' The legislation would be enforceable
against the NCAA, and the NCAA's bylaws could not force com-
pliance with threats of deeming a player ineligible.8"' The NCPA
also recommends legislation that would "deregulate" the NCAA.90
Such legislation includes a law to allow member colleges to pro-
vide larger scholarships to help players make ends meet."'
In early 2011, the NCAA proposed allowing companies like Ni-
ke and Under Armour the ability to feature college athletes in
advertising.92 A possible scene would be famous college players
wearing the Nike emblem and endorsing Nike in commercials
and print advertisements." Currently, the NCAA's rules bar this
kind of activity, but under the proposal student-athletes could
take part in television and other advertisements as long as the
advertisement also featured the student's institution.' Athletes
would likely join the opposition to this proposal. The opposition
has "called the proposal 'the essence of exploitation,"' because
Gold, WASH. POST, June 1, 2004, at A01 (detailing Michael Phelps's advertisements).
186. Ben Cohen, The Case for Paying College Athletes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2011, at
D10. ("The financial burden would land with the shoe companies, multinational corpora-
tions and local car dealerships who want to enlist the athletes to help them push prod-
ucts.").
187. HuMA & STAUROWSKY, supra note 18, at 26.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 25.
190. Id. at 26.
191. Id.
192. See Libby Sander, NCAA Proposal Would Give Companies More Latitude to Use
Athletes' Images in Ads, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://chronicle.com/arti
cle/NCAA-Proposal-Would-Give/125914.
193. See id.
194. Id.
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athletes would still have no right to profit off of such images. 9 5
There is a call to modernize the advertising and marketing rules
in this system, but to pass such a measure would continue to ex-
ploit the student-athletes.
The Olympic model seems to reconcile the desire to promote
athleticism and academics while still providing students with the
opportunity to maintain the rights to his or her image and talent.
This method is also appealing to the NCAA because it is the least
costly measure. There would be no payment directly from the
university to the athlete, and the athlete would be responsible for
his or her own endorsements. The challenge would be to pressure
the NCAA to change the current bylaw to allow the implementa-
tion of this model.
Critics might argue that the Olympic model provides "pay-
ment" only to star athletes, which is completely true. Star ath-
letes will be more sought after than student-athletes participat-
ing in less popular sports. Yet the big money affects only a certain
population of college athletes. Right or wrong, this scenario is the
current landscape of college athletics. The small percentage of
players who attract million-dollar television contracts should
have the ability to take part in the free market if they so choose.
2. A Paycheck for the Players
On November 2, 2011, USA Today ran a story about Con-
gressman Bobby Rush's obvious disdain for the NCAA.'96 Con-
gressman Rush compared the NCAA to the mafia and Al Ca-
pone.' The Congressman made these remarks at a forum called
especially to investigate the impact of "'back-room deals, payoffs
and scandals' in college sports.""' About a week before USA To-
day reported about Congressman Rush's comparison between the
NCAA and the mafia, the NCAA announced the possibility of pay-
ing student-athletes an extra $2000 per year to supplement
195. Id. (quoting Jams E. Delany).
196. Nicole Auerback, Congressman Likens NCAA to Capone, Mafia, USA TODAY, Nov.
2, 2011, at 6C (quoting Congressman Rush, who described the NCAA as "one of the most
vicious, most ruthless organizations ever created by mankind").
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Congressman Rush).
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scholarships." The NCAA president was adamant that this
$2000 stipend was not a "pay-for-play" measure, but was instead
meant to "close the gap" between the true cost of attending col-
lege and the scholarship funds student-athletes receive.20 0 The
NCAA chose to give conferences the option of giving student-
athletes the $2000 stipend.o' The NCAA, in consecutive meetings
in December 2011 and January 2012, tabled the discussion of the
stipend and, as of time of publication, plans to address the issue
in August 2012.202
The proposal has been expressly denied as a "pay-for-play"
measure, but colleges and universities could opt to simply write
students a check each week or semester for their participation in
the money-generating sports. The payment might cover the gap
between true living costs and the scholarship awarded to the stu-
dent. Payments could come after a successful game or be kept in a
trust fund until the student-athlete graduates. The true pay-for-
play measure is unsettling because of the complicated nature of
setting a salary or pay scale for some athletes and not others. The
member institutions and colleges would be required to find finan-
cial means to pay for athletes' talents.
The pure pay-for-play measure seems unworkable if the NCAA
is to maintain a sense of amateurism at all. Otherwise, the col-
lege sports teams could simply become professional sports teams,
where enrollment in the college or university is welcomed but not
required.2 0 3 Student-athletes should still be treated as students
with academic goals. Handing them a paycheck and calling them
an employee may taint the amateur model too much. However,
199. Id.
200. NCAA Prez: Stipend Not 'Pay for Play', ESPN (Nov. 3, 2011, 6:56 PM), http://
espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7187028/ncaa-stipend-not-lean-pay-play-president-
mark-emmert-says.
201. David Wharton, NCAA's Pay-For-Play Proposal Has Its Supporters and Detrac-
tors, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/16/sports/la-sp-1117-
ncaa-pay-for-play-20111117.
202. Athlete Stipend Delayed, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2011, at Bl8 (noting that "125 col-
leges requested the delay"); Michael Marot, NCAA Considers Delaying Some Academic
Changes, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/sports/
2018070861-apncaanewproposals.html.
203. See Branch, supra note 8 ("The International Olympic Committee expunged the
word amateur from its charter in 1986. Olympic officials, who had once disdained the
NCAA for offering scholarships in exchange for athletic performance, came to welcome
millionaire athletes from every quarter, while the NCAA still refused to let the pro Olym-
pian Michael Phelps swim for his college team at Michigan.").
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allowing them to profit based on their individual talents and their
individual decisions to enter the free market seems to strike a
balance. Legally, the student-athlete may be more like a student
employee than a volunteer athlete. Yet notions of amateurism
still dominate the academic landscape, and the Olympic model
provides ample room for students to remain student-athletes in-
stead of professionals. The NCAA itself must change, not only to
allow for the Olympic model but also to provide student-athletes
with greater rights under the bylaws themselves including multi-
year guaranteed scholarships, the ability to transfer freely within
the open market, and freedom to participate in athletics as the
law allows. The NCAA must become the moral institution it once
thought it would be.204
V. A NEW NCAA
A. NCAA Self-Regulation
Regardless of whether Ed O'Bannon and his co-plaintiffs win
their antitrust lawsuit, it is clear that the law must step in to
protect the student-athlete. The NCAA, despite its "amateurism"
goals, has failed to self-regulate and has instead created a system
exploiting the student-athlete. Member universities and colleges
are also at fault. They have continued to take part in a system
that ultimately brings them just what they want and need: mon-
ey and publicity.205 The NCAA has become more of a "trade asso-
ciation for coaches and athletic directors, implementing their
wishes regardless of whether these are in the best interests of the
member schools, or the multitude of athletes engaged in intercol-
legiate athletics."206 Member schools have yet to put pressure on
the NCAA to make changes. Although many athletic programs,
and arguably most, are not profitable,207 success in Division I
men's basketball and football generates huge revenues and places
204. "Collegiate amateurism is not a moral issue; it is an economic camouflage for mo-
nopoly practice." Byers, supra note 57, at 376.
205. Sperber, supra note 83, at 33-34 ("One of the most pernicious myths about the
NCAA is that the association represents the will of its member colleges and universities,
and that it tries to keep intercollegiate athletics in line with its members' educational ob-
jectives.").
206. Id. at 34.
207. Id. at 35.
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these colleges on center stage. Athletic success often equates to
higher numbers of university applicants and positive publicity.20 s
Additionally, appearances in postseason basketball tournaments
and football bowl games are a good indicator of alumni dona-
tions.209 Robert Baade and Jeffrey Sundberg's study on alumni
generosity found that "alumni giving for a successful college bowl
game increased on average about 54 percent."2 0 College athletics
affects more than the sports programs; it affects the entire uni-
versity-its reputation, status, and the public's interest.
Based on the bylaws in place, as well as the money at stake,
"looking to the NCAA itself as a source of potential reform of col-
lege athletics is equivalent to putting the fox in charge of the
henhouse."2 11 If the NCAA, the body dedicated to regulating col-
lege athletics and protecting student-athletes, cannot adequately
protect students through the implementation of fair and just poli-
cies, another entity must take charge and create some clarity
from the chaos.
B. Government Intervention
Based on the visible corruption and exploitation within the big
NCAA football and basketball teams, something must be done to
correct the system or at least assist student-athletes participating
at member institutions. Although only a small percentage of
NCAA student-athletes participate on the big college teams, this
issue is still of resounding importance. A recent NCPA report
notes that "[w]ithout an act of Congress and support from the
[Department of Justice], universities, athletic programs, coaches,
208. See Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope, The Impact of College Sports Success on the
Quantity and Quality of Student Applications, 75 S. ECON. J. 750, 750 ("Key findings in-
clude the following: (1) football and basketball success significantly increases the quantity
of applications to a school, with estimates ranging from 2% to 8% for the top 20 football
schools and the top 16 basketball schools each year, (2) private schools see increases in
application rates after sports success that are two to four times higher than public schools,
(3) the extra applications received are composed of both low and high SAT scoring stu-
dents, thus providing potential for schools to improve their admission outcomes, and (4)
schools appear to exploit these increases in applications by improving both the number
and the quality of incoming students.").
209. Yost, supra note 151, at 48-49.
210. Id. at 48 (citing Robert A. Baade & Jeffrey Sunberg, What Determines Alumni
Generosity?, 15 EcON. EDUC. REV. 75, 75-81 (1996)).
211. ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III, BRIAN L. GOFF & ROBERT D. TOLLIsoN, THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 145-46 (1992).
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and players will continue to spiral embarrassingly into the abyss
that has been on full display over the past 12 months and be-
yond."212 The report further concluded that "[c]ollege athletes will
also continue to drift as a group of Americans harmed by the
NCAA's un[-]American, monopolistic arrangements."m Govern-
ment intervention may be the only fix.214
Congress or the judiciary must take action because the NCAA
has failed to self-regulate. The student-athlete has become the
plaintiff in legal actions because the NCAA and member institu-
tions have failed to adequately protect the students' interests.
Walter Byers suggests that the NCAA should require a report
card in academics and publicly reported financials for all member
institutions.215 Most importantly, he suggests that Congress enact
a College Athletes Bill of Rights.216 Student-athletes should be
taking part in the free market while also acquiring an education.
Notions of amateurism and the fans' "comfort" with the current
system should not take precedence over an individual's right to
compete with fair compensation for their talents. If the law is
about enforcing justice and fairness, the NCAA and the member
institutions themselves have avoided the law for far too long.
VI. CONCLUSION
Division I men's basketball and football programs are multi-
billion dollar businesses that rest on the voluntary labor of young
men. The NCAA's arbitrary rules,217 which apply to all NCAA
student-athletes, maintain a system that operates with revenue,
rather than the protection of student-athletes, as its first priority.
The NCAA is charged with serving as an advocate for all NCAA
athletes, but the NCAA's bylaws operate counter to that
212. HUMA & STAUROWSKY, supra note 18, at 25.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See Byers, supra note 57, at 392-94.
216. Id. at 374.
217. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The Latest N.C.A.A. Impermissible Benefit? Books, N.Y.
TIMES BLOG (Feb. 3, 2012, 1:34 PM), http://nocera.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/the-latest
-n-c-a-a-impermissible-benefit-textbooks. The NCAA put the University of Nebraska on
two-year probation and fined the school $38,000 for the "major violation" of providing stu-
dent-athletes "not just the books that were required for their courses, but also the books
that their professors recommended as helpful reading for their classes." Id.
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goal. These student-athletes deserve more-more compensation,
more due process rights, more transparency, and more stability
as student-athletes. Congressional and judicial intervention is
likely their best and, perhaps, only shot.
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